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THE ASCENT TO MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVENESS: 

DEFENSE FIRMS vs. NON-DEFENSE FIRMS 

Abstract 

Facing rapidly changing markets and increasing competition, the competitive environment of the defense 
industry has undergone extensive restructuring, significantly more so than for the non-defense sector. This 
comprehensive survey of defense and non-defense finns offers insight into the defense industry's journey 
into open competition, as well as insight into different strategic approaches to manufacturing 
competitiveness during this critical period. The data suggest that the surviving defense finns have 
strengthened, and that defense and non-defense manufacturers alike are responding competitively to the call 
of the global economy. 
INTRODUCfrON 
With extensive cutbacks in the U.S. defense industry, the manufacturing firms which were directly affected 
entered a period of significant stress, threatening their very viability. For example, consider New England 
which has experienced the loss of over 200,000 jobs in defense and defense-related industries since the 
defense buildup under the Reagan administration, with further expectations of declining manufacturing 
employment for the next several years (Mulligan, 1995). Other regions are affected similarly by this 
economic morass, presenting significant challenges for the defense manufacturers currently under siege. 
Consequently, the primary goals of The American Manufacturing Competitiveness Project are to assess and 
to possibly assist the defense conversion industries in their adjustment to the fiercely competitive, open 
marketplace.1 With non-defense frrms serving as a surrogate for benchmarking, this study should be of 
particular interest to the defense frrms as they formulate their own manufacturing strategies in response to 
the competitiveness of the commercial market. Furthermore, by providing a basis for comparison, this study 
should be beneficial to all other competitively-oriented manufacturers as they try to become, and remain, 
competitive in the current ubiquitous global economy. 
MANUFACTURING STRATEGY LITERATURE 
In the global arena, producers worldwide are seeking manufacturing competitiveness with a new sense of 
urgency. As first espoused by Skinner (1974) as the core tenet of manufacturing competitiveness, the 
concept of the "focused factory" is giving way to other approaches in more recent manufacturing strategy 
literature (Corbett and Van Wassenhove, 1993; Ferdows and DeMeyer, 1990; Hall and Nakane, 1990; 
Nakane, 1986; Noble, 1997; Noble, 1995a; Noble, 1995b; Noble and Schrnenner, 1992a; Noble and 
Schmenner, 1992b; Noble and Schrnenner, 1994). The assumed inherent manufacturing "trade-offs" as 
implied by the focused factory concept (e.g., trading quality for low cost, and low cost for flexibility), are 
now being challenged by the concept of a sequential, cumulative buildup of frequently cited manufacturing 
competitive priorities such as quality, dependability, delivery, cost, flexibility, and innovation. In order to 
build lasting competitive advantage, the cumulative approach to manufacturing competitiveness suggests 
that top performing competitors build one capability (competitive priority) upon another, over time, in a 
cumulative fashion, rather than trading one for another as suggested by the manufacturing trade-off 
approach. However, neither the trade-off approach nor the cumulative approach has been empirically, and 
decisively, established or overturned. 
Thus, the key to manufacturing competitiveness remains elusive. What has been clearly demonstrated via 
empirical evidence is that the more successful finns compete on the basis of multiple capabilities, which is 
inconsistent with the trade-off approach. The manufacturing trade-offs approach does not appear to be 
serving its proponents well in achieving and maintaining manufacturing competitiveness (Noble, 1997; 
Noble, 1995). Yet, it remains pervasive in the manufacturing strategy literature-- albeit frequently in 
modified form-- and many manufacturers continue to draw upon it for guidance. The present study is 
designed to address further the keys to manufacturing competitiveness, benefiting both defense and non­
defense manufacturers. 
1 The American Manufacturing Competitiveness Project was sponsored by the Center for International Business 
and Economic Development (CmED) of Bryant College through a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD). 
-----------------------------------------------------------------_.--------­
METHODOLOGY 
The Survey Instrument 
Drawing upon several preliminary, defense plant interviews and earlier studies (including the questionnaire 
developed by Roger W. Schmenner for a productivity study (Schmenner, 1988», an in-depth survey 
instrument was then designed, after which it was critiqued by several manufacturing managers. Next, a 
small pilot test involving twelve defense-related Rhode Island manufacturers was implemented using the 
newly revised survey instrument. As based on the pilot test, the questionnaire was further refined. The 
resultant survey includes approximately 180 questions, and spans a six year period, from about the 
beginning of the decline of the defense industry in 1990 to the present, and then projects into the future. It is 
comprised of six major sections: (1) the plant profile; (2) product changes; (3) process changes; (4) 
manufacturing capabilities; (5) measures (productivity, ROJ, market share, and others); and (6) comments 
(two open-ended questions). The questions probe into marketplace competitive priorities, manufacturing 
competitive priorities, what is actually happening in the plant in that regard, as well as performance 
measures. 
The Sample 
Defense related and non-defense frrms were selected randomly from several manufacturing databases. The 
criteria for inclusion consisted of (1) location-- Southern New England, Florida, Texas and California-- each 
of which has a comparatively large, defense-related industry segment; and (2) size (between 100 and 500 
employees). Many of these relatively small and medium size defense-related frrms are suppliers to the 
larger, defense frrms. Thus, an additional, smaller sample was drawn from large defense frrms for purposes 
of comparison. Some of the frrms which responded were either smaller than the 100 employee lower limit, 
or else larger that the 500 employee limit because they had either contracted or expanded after having been 
entered into the database from which it was selected. 
In order to obtain the manufacturing manager's cooperation and participation, each firm thus selected was 
called in advance of sending the questionnaire. Surveys were then sent to the 236 frrms whose 
manufacturing managers had verbally agreed to participate. An additional seventeen declined for reasons of 
not having enough time, to just not being interested. A total of 99 surveys were returned, of which 96 were 
usable, yielding a net response rate of 40.7% after four postcard follow-ups. Given that the survey 
instrument was lengthy and asked for detailed information, this is considered a good response rate. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Overview of the Data 
First, the database was segmented into three subsets: (1) non-defense frrms having fewer than 800 
employees in 1990 and in 1996 (n=51); (2) defense-related frrms also having fewer that 800 employees in 
1990 and in 1996 (n=40); and (3) larger defense frrms with equal to, or greater than 800 employees in 1990 
and in 1996 (n=5). The company profiles and performance measures were then examined to gain an overall 
perspective of the frrms within the database. T -tests for significance of difference in the means between the 
51 non-defense and 40 defense frrms were performed for purposes of comparison. and the observed 
significance levels given. The findings for the larger facilities (800 or more employees) are also given as 
they may be suggestive of the direction of larger frrms, even though not statistically significant or 
conc1usive due to the small sample size of only five facilities. 
By examining Table I for the changes between 1990 and 1996, one can see that the number of employees 
has increased for the non-defense frrms by 23.5%; whereas, for the equivalent subset of defense frrms, the 
number of employees decreased by 18.9%. and for the large defense firms, a decrease of 7.6%. Total sales 
increased for all subsets: for the non-defense firms, by 57.9%, for the medium sized defense frrms and large 
defense firms. 0.3% and 6.4%, respectively. 
Insert Table I about here 
Additionally, as seen in Table II, labor productivity appears to be significantly higher (9.9% vs. 5.7%, sig. 
level =.076) for the defense frrms than for the non-defense firms. This finding is not surprising, given the 
decrease in total number of employees for the defense frrms, on top of fairly level sales during this time 
period. Of note as well, is that for all three segmentations, both market share and Return on Investment 
(ROI) has increased between 1990 and 1996. Market share increased by 8.8% for the non-defense related 
frrms. by 21.5% for the medium size defense frrms, and by 8.9% for the large defense frrms. As measured 
by the means of ROI categories, the non-defense frrms mean ROI increased by 21.4%, the defense frrms by 
30.3%, and the large defense frrms by 20.0%. 
Insert Table II about here 
Product Related Changes 
The three subsets were also analyzed for differences in the way their main product line competes in the 
marketplace. The greater number of statistically significant differences in 1996 (four vs. two), as well as the 
ranking of the marketplace requirements, may possibly indicate that the competitive requirements of the 
marketplace on non-defense frrms and the defense frrms were becoming more dissimilar; whereas. with 
defense frrms venturing into commercial products, the opposite might have been predicted. See Table m. 
One might also note that quality's importance to competition in the marketplace has increased for the 
defense frrms, whereas for the non-defense firms, quality's importance has decreased. At the same time, 
price has become less important for both subsets. For both non-defense firms and defense firms, quick 
delivery is becoming increasing important. And for defense firms, rapid new product introduction has 
assumed new importance by 1996, perhaps in response to the transition to the commercial sector. 
Insert Table ill about here 
Process Related Changes 
In regard to process related changes, areas of statistically significant differences between the means for the 
non-defense firms and defense firms include raw materials, work-in-process, finished goods inventories, and 
Statistical Process Control (SPC). As for recent achievements, the areas of greatest achievements (more than 
50% of the finns) for the non-defense firms include improved quality and throughput time reduction. For 
the defense firms, with fewer than 800 employees, the only area of improvement with more than 50% of the 
finns was improved quality, in common with the non-defense firms. Between those two subsets, the only 
statistically significant differences were for higher materials yields, throughput time reduction, and 
reduction of overhead, with the non-defense finns scoring higher in these areas. The only recent 
achievement (more than 50%) for the larger defense firms was in the area of improved quality. See Table 
IV. 
Insert Table IV about here 
Fifty percent or more of the non-defense firms indicated they were planning to improve quality and material 
yields; whereas, fifty percent or more of the defense related firms (fewer than 800 employees) planned to 
improve quality, material yields, throughput time, and overhead. There were no statistically significant 
differences of intent between the two primary subsets, with the exception perhaps of new FMS installations. 
For the large defense fmns, the targeted areas for improvement include quality, material yields, machine 
and/or line speed, throughput time, overhead, and new product introduction. 
The only other areas of statistically significant differences among the process related variables concerned 
quality: (1) SPC in 1996, (2) measuring quality in 1990 and in 1996, and (3) TQM in 1996, with the defense 
fmns scoring higher in each area. This general finding also applies to the ISO certification question in that, 
in 1996, 55% of the non-defense fmns were either certified in ISO 9000, or were in the process of 
certification; whereas, for the defense fmns, the equivalent finding was 82% certified or in the process of 
certification. Additionally, for the larger defense firms in 1990, none of the sample of five were certified, or 
in the process of certification; while in 1996, 100% were certified or in the process of certification. In each 
case, the defense fmns appear to be more quality oriented. These quality related findings are consistent with 
the defense fmns' apparent greater emphasis on quality in order to compete in the marketplace in 1996 
(89.7% vs. 71.4%). 
Manufacturing Capabilities 
The prioritization of manufacturing capabilities tended to change somewhat from time period to time period 
for both non-defense and defense fmns, and for commercial production versus defense production for the 
defense fmns. Evidence of this phenomenon was not as strong as suggested by the preliminary plant 
interviews in the fITst phase of the study, which may possibly be due to the smaller size of the plants which 
were interviewed. This perhaps may indicate greater turbulence in the smaller companies' product lines. 
In general, the investigation of the prioritization of manufacturing capabilities in this study appears to lend 
some support to the cumulative build-up of capabilities as suggested by the cumulative approach to 
manufacturing competitiveness. The cumulative manufacturing capability approach suggests that quality is 
the foundation upon which dependability, delivery, cost, flexibility, then innovation are built. The data in 
this study suggest that for both the defense fmns and the non-defense fmns, the quality would have the 
highest priority, and flexibility and innovation the least, consistent with the cumulative approach. The 
biggest difference between the two subsets appears to be that for the non-defense fmns in 1996, cost, 
delivery, and dependability are similar in terms of prioritization emphasis, whereas for the defense firms, 
quality, delivery and cost seem to be grouped. Refer to Table V. 
Insert Table V about here 
CONCLUSION 
Defense-related fmns, which are in the process of converting from defense to commercial, are now faced 
with defending themselves against the open competition and segmentation of the commercial sector. These 
fmns which formerly operated within the confines of the defense industry are now having to learn new, 
more effective ways to maximize the resources of their production facilities. It is imperative for these fmns 
to recognize how they are actually competing in the market, and then to carefully develop manufacturing 
competitive priorities consistent with their corporate goals for lasting competitiveness. 
The survey data suggest that much of the shake-out of the defense industry already has taken place. 
Additionally, the data strongly suggest that, on the average, the surviving defense fmns have restructured 
and are now 'leaner and meaner.' The success of these remaining fmns in the defense industry is evidenced 
by the all three performance measures, i.e., by comparing their labor productivity, market share and ROI 
with those of the non-defense fmns. Additionally, the process related changes of the defense firms compare 
favorably with the non-defense firms, as seen in the tables. 
Perhaps one of the most significant fmdings of the survey of these medium sized firms is that almost every 
measure addressed in this investigation has very clearly shown an extremely strong thrust towards 
manufacturing competitiveness among U.S. manufacturers, including both defense and non-defense fmns. 
And the remaining "leaner and meaner" defense firms are perhaps stronger than before the disruption of the 
market. Those that have survived the downsizing of the defense industry are now in a more competitive, yet 
more profitable market. Yet, it should be noted also that this study could not identify, nor address, the many 
defense-related manufacturers which did not survive. Thus, the sample was by nature biased towards the 
stronger, surviving fmns within the defense industry. 
In contrast to the defense fmns, although the commercial sector has also undergone dramatic changes over 
the last few years due to increased overall competition, the commercial has not had the additional burden of 
defense conversion. The commercial sector has had the opportunity to move further down the learning curve 
in comparison to the newly arrived, formerly defense fmns. Competing in the open market has relatively 
honed the commercial sector's competitive skills. 
Importantly, as seen in the data, this study lends further support to the cumulative approach to 
manufacturing competitiveness, currently being addressed in manufacturing strategy literature as a vehicle 
towards lasting competitive advantage. 
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Table I Company Profile: Means, unless otherwise indicated (n=valid cases) 
(Refer to note at end of 
table. ) 
Non-Defense < 800 
(Sample size: 51) 
Defense < 800 emp. 
(Sample size 40) 
Obs.Sig.* 
(2-Tail ) 
Defense ~ 800 emp 
(Sample size = 5) 
Age of plant (years) 
Total employees 1990 
21. 898 (49) 
188.694 (49 ) 
27.276 (38) 
234.079 (38 ) 
.191 
.170 
27.400 (5 ) 
3925.800 (5) 
Total employees 1996 233.080 (50) 189.733 (40) .107 3626.400 (5 ) 
Total Sales 1990 $27,734,418 (43) $39,342,424 (33) .357 $659,225,000 (4) 
Total Sales 1996 $43,797,261 (46) $39,473,529 (34) .746 $701,725,000 (4 ) 
Defense Sales 1990 0.8% (49) 42.8% (38) .000 82.6% (5 ) 
Defense Sales 1996 0.09% (51) 40.1% (38 ) .000 74.4% (5) 
Note: Obs.Sig.*: T -Tests observed significance level for difference in means between the non-defense related firms and the defense firms 
with fewer than 800 employees in 1990 and 1996. 
--
--
--
--
-- --
-- -- --
--
-- --
--
--
-- --
Table IT Perfonnance Measures: Means, unless otherwise indicated (n=valid cases) 
--­
_._ .. _..............­
(Refer to note at bottom of Non-Defense < 800 Defense < 800 emp. Obs. Sig.* Defense ~ 800 emp. 
table. ) (Sample size = 51) (Sample size: 40) (2-Tail) (Sample size = 5) 
General productivity growth 8.5% (34) 10.6% (17 ) .423 9.1% (4 ) 
Labor productivity growth 5.7% (45) 9.9% (28) .076 7.5% (4 ) 
INDUSTRY PD'TY GROWTH: frequency: frequency: frequency: 
Well below U.S. ave. 1 4 9% 3 8% 
Somewhat below . 2 5 11% 9 25% 1 20% 
About the U.S. ave. 3 22 49% 14 39% 2 40% 
Somewhat above 4 14 31% 8 22% 
Well above U.S. ave 5 2 6% 2 40% 
(36) (5 ) 
(45) mean rating 2.917 mean rating: 3.600 
mean rating = 3.022 
FIRM'S RECENT PRODUCTIVITY: frequency: frequency: frequency: 
Pd'ty has declined. 1 1 2% 
Pd'ty has not advanced 2 3 6% 3 8% 
1 20%Advanced but slower 3 11 22% 8 21% 
2 40%15 31% 9 24%Advanced about same 4 
2 40%19 39% 18 47%Quickened . 5 
(5)(49) (32) 
mean rating= 4.200mean rating = 4.000 mean rating = 4.105 
Market share 1990 38.6% (34) 40.4% (27) .805 51% (4) 
56% (4)Market share 1996 42.0% (39) 49.1% (28 ) .295 
frequency:RETURN ON INVESTMENT 1990: frequency: frequency: 
1 25%Less than 0% . 1 3 8% 3 9% 
2 50%0% to 4.9% . 2 7 19% 12 38% 
5% to 9.9% . 3 11 30% 9 28% 
10% to 14.9% . . . 4 9 24% 5 16% 
(Refer to note at bottom of Non-Defense < 800 Defense < 800 emp. Obs. Sig.* Defense;::; 800 emp. 
table. ) (Sample size = 51) (Sample size = 40) (2-Tail ) (Sample size = 5) 
15% to 19.9% 
· 5 1 3% 3 9% 1 25% 
20% or more . 6 6 16% -­ -­
-­ -­
(37) (32) (4) 
mean rating = 3.432 mean rating = 2.781 .321 mean rating = 2.5 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT 1996: frequency: frequency: frequency: 
Less than 0% 1 -­ -­ -­ -­ -­
-­
0% to 4.9% 
· 2 7 17% 7 22% 1 25% 
5% to 9.9% . 
· 3 7 17% 8 25% 2 50% 
10% to 14.9% 
· 4 10 24% 9 28% 1 25% 
15% to 19.9% . . 
· 5 8 19% 6 19% - -­
20% or more . 6 10 24% 2 6% -­ -
(42 ) (32) (4 ) 
mean rating = 4.167 mean rating 3.625 .087 mean rating 3.0 
Note: Obs.Sig.*: T-Tests observed significance level for difference in means between the non-defense related firms and the defense firms 
with fewer than 800 employees in 1990 and 1996. 
Table m Marketplace Competitive Requirements Ranked in Order of Importance 
(See note at bottom of table.) 
Non-Defense < 800 emp. 
(Sample size = 51 ) 
Defense < 800 employees 
(Sample size = 40) 
Defense ~ 800 employees 
(Sample size = 5) 
1990 (% of firms) 1990 (% of firms) 1990 (% of firms) 
, Quality 73.9 Quality 78.9 Performance feat. 100.0 
Price 52.2 Reliability of pdt 57.9 , Reliability/pdt 80.0 
, 
Reliability of pdt 45.7 Price 50.0 Quality 40.0 
Reliabili ty of del 43.5 Reliability of del 50.0 Best value pdt 40.0 
i Best value pdt 37.0 Best value pdt 34.2 Rapid new pdt int 20.0 
Pdt custamization 30.4 Performance feat. 28.9 Pdt customization 20.0 
Quick delivery 28.3 Quick delivery 21.1 Freq new pdt intr 20.0 
Performance Feat. 26.1 Durability of pdt 21.1 i Durability of pdt 20.0 
Durability of pdt 19.6 Pdt custamization 15.8 Reliability/del 0.0 
Rapid new pdt intr 15.2 Pdn rate flex. 13.2 Quick delivery 0.0 
Pdn rate flex 8.7 Rapid new pdt intr 2.6 Price 0.0 
Freq. new pdt intr 6.5 Freq new pdt intr 2.6 Pdn rate flex 0.0 
1996 (% of firms) 1996 (% of firms) 1996 (% of firms) 
Quality 71.4 Quality 89.7 Best value pdt 60.0 
Reliabili ty/pdt 55.1 Reliability/pdt 53.8 Quality 60.0 
Price 49.0 Reliability/ del 46.2 i Performance feat 60.0 
Best value pdt 46.9 Price 43.6 Reliabili ty/pdt 40.0 
Reliable/del 44.9 Quick delivery 43.6 Price 40.0 
Quick delivery 40.8 Performance feat 33.3 , Reliability/del 20.0 
Pdt customization 26.5 Best value pdt 28.2 Rapid new pdt intr 20.0 
Performance feat 26.5 Durability of pdt 20.5 Pdt customization 20.0 
Durability of pdt 18.4 Pdt customization 17 .9 Durability of pdt 20.0 
Freq new pdt intro 10.2 Pdn rate flex 12.8 Quick delivery 0.0 
Rapid new pdt intro 8.2 Rapid new pdt intr 10.3 Freq new pdt intro 0.0 
Defense ;::: 800 employeesNon-Defense < 800 emp. Defense < 800 employees 
(Sample size = 51) (Sample size = 40) (Sample size = 5) 
Pdn rate flex 4.1 Preq Dew pdt intr 0.0 Pdn rate flex 0.0 
Note: 	 Variables presented in bold represent a statistically sig. difference between the means of the 
non-defense and defense subsets. A higher percentage mean indicates a greater importance of 
that particular variable to competition in the marketplace. 
--
Table IV Process Related Changes: Means-- unless otherwise indicated (n=valid cases) 
(Refer to note at bottom of 
table. ) 
AGE OF EQUIPMENT (mean %): 
Over 20 years old . 
11-20 years old . 
Non-Defense < 
(sample size 
25.26 
23.33 
800 
51) 
(45) 
(45) 
Defense < 800 emp. 
(Sample size = 40) 
29.95 (37) 
24.89 (38 ) 
Obs. Sig.* 
(2-Tail ) 
.489 
.712 
-­
Defense 
(Sample 
11.0 
18.0 
~ 800 emp. 
size = 5) 
(5 ) 
(5 ) 
6-10 years old . 26.80 (45) 22.86 (36 ) .338 38.0 (5 ) 
3-5 years old 19.41 (45) 17.39 (35) .593 17.0 (5 ) 
Less than 3 years old . 14.82 (45) 14.00 (35 ) .780 17.0 (5 ) 
MRP 1990 (% yes) 26.67 (45 ) 42.11 (38) .142 80.0 (5 ) 
MRP 1996 (% yes) 56.00 (50) 67.50 (40) .271 100.0 (5 ) 
Process flow chg. (1990-96) 
(1 job shop. 5 continuous) 
3.469 (49) 3.256 (39) .398 3.4 (5) 
PROCESS CHANGES (1990-96) 
(1 higher, 5 much lower): 
Materials scrap rate 3.729 (48) 3.641 (39) .693 4.20 (5) 
Degree of rework 3.660 (47) 3.615 (39) .830 4.20 (5 ) 
Quality complaints 3.702 (47) 3.795 (39) .602 3.80 (5 ) 
Shortages 3.422 (45) 3.460 (37) .866 3.40 (5 ) 
Expediting in plant 2.956 (45) 2.892 (37) .791 4.20 (5 ) 
Work-in-process inventory 3.444 (45) 3.605 (38 ) .465 3.60 (5 ) 
Degree of cross training 2.277 (47) 2.395 (38) .609 3.00 (5 ) 
(Refer to note at bottom of 
table. ) 
Finished goods inventory 
Raw materials inv. 1990 (%) 
Raw materials inv. 1996 (%) 
Work-in-process 1990 (% ) 
Work-in-process 1996 (% ) 
Finished goods inv.1990 (%) 
Finished goods inv.1996 (%) 
JIT 1990 (1 none, 5 much) 
JIT 1996 (1 none, 5 much) 
FMS 1990 (1 none, 5 much) 
FMS 1996 (1 none, 5 much) 
SPC 1990 (1 none, 5 much) 
SPC 1996 (1 none, 5 much) 
RECENT ACHIEVEMENTS(% yes): 
Improved quality 
Higher material yields 
New, rearranged layout 
Machine/line speed impv. 
Linking of process seg. 
Non-Defense < 800 
(Sample size = 51) 
3.457 (46) 
46.25 (46) 
43.69 (47) 
26.75 (41) 
26.90 (46) 
30.75 (41) 
30.63 (46) 
2.723 (47) 
3.490 (51) 
2.133 (45) 
2.735 (49) 
2.000 (47) 
2.628 (51) 
52.94 (51) 
43.14 (51) 
49.02 (51) 
39.22 (51) 
39.22 (51) 
Defense < 800 emp. 
(Sample size = 40) 
3.737 (38 ) 
33.03 (32) 
29.83 (35 ) 
47.45 (33) 
50.11 (36) 
20.71 (31) 
20.04 (35) 
2.421 (38) 
3.308 (39) 
2.057 (35) 
2.784 (37) 
2.342 (38) 
3.205 (39) 
62.50 (40) 
25.00 (40) 
42.50 (40) 
37.50 (40) 
32.50 (40 ) 
Obs. Sig.* 
(2-Tail) 
.212 
.010 
.007 
.000 
.000 
.072 
.046 
.283 
.474 
.741 
.853 
.186 
.061 
.366 
.074 
.541 
.869 
.514 
Defense ~ 800 emp. 
(Sample size = 5) 
3.40 (5) 
37.0 (4 ) 
37.0 (5 ) 
41.0 (4) 
50.0 (5 ) 
21.0 (4) 
13.0 (5 ) 
2.40 (5) 
3.20 (5) 
2.00 (5) 
2.80 (5) 
2.80 (5 ) 
4.20 (5) 
80.00 (5 ) 
40.00 (5 ) 
0.00 (5 ) 
20.00 ( 5) 
20.00 (5 ) 
~.- ....-­
(Refer to note at bottom of Non-Defense < 800 Defense < 800 emp. Obs. Sig.* Defense ~ 800 emp. 
table. ) (Sample size = 51) (Sample size = 40) (2-Tail) (Sample size = 5) 
New automation 33.33 (51) 40.00 (40) .517 20.00 (5 ) 
Improved automation 11. 76 (51) 7.50 (40) .504 40.00 (5) 
Throughput time reduction 58.82 (51) 45.00 (40 ) .194 40.00 (5 ) 
Materials shortage impv. 23.53 (51) 35.00 (40) .234 20.00 (5 ) 
Materials handling impv. 35.29 (51) 27.50 (40) .434 0.00 (5) 
Improved delivery 49.02 (51) 47.50 (40) .887 20.00 (5 ) 
Reduction of overhead 31.37 (51) 47.50 (40) .119 60.00 (5) 
Impv. of new pdt. intro. 25.49 (51) 17.50 (40 ) .367 60.00 (5 ) 
Lower work-in-process 33.33 (51) 27.50 (40) .555 60.00 (5) 
New FMS installations 9.80 (51) 5.00 (40 ) .399 0.00 (5) 
Impv. maintenance program 35.29 (51) 37.50 (40) .830 40.00 (5) 
PLANNED IMPROVEMENT(% yes): 
Improve quality 66.67 (51) 70.00 (40) .738 80.00 (5 ) 
Higher material yields 50.98 (51) 50.00 (40) .927 100.00 (5) 
New, rearranged layout 39.22 (51 ) 45.00 (40) .584 40.00 (5 ) 
Machine/line speed impv. 31. 37 (51) 27.50 (40) .692 80.00 (5 ) 
Linking of process seg. 29.41 (51) 25.00 (40) .644 40.00 (5) 
New automation 47.06 (51) 37.50 (40) .366 40.00 (5) 
Improve automation 17.65 (51) 17.50 (40 ) .986 40.00 (5) 
---.-...---.-.....--......... ~- ..........--.-........... _._ ...... ­ ~ -_.............__ ............ _-­
(Refer to note at bottom of Non-Defense < 800 Defense < 800 emp. Obs. Sig.* Defense 2 800 emp. 
table. ) (Sample size = 51) (Sample size = 40) (2-Tail) (Sample size = 5) 
I 
Throughput time reduction - 47.06 (51) 50.00 (40) .783 80.00 (5 ) 
Materials shortage impv. 39.22 (51) 30.00 (40 ) .366 40.00 (5 ) 
Materials handling impv. 29.41 (51) 25.00 (40) .644 40.00 (5) 
Improve delivery 49.02 (51) 47.50 (40) .887 40.00 (5) 
Reduction of overhead 47.06 (51) 55.00 (40) .458 80.00 (5) 
Impv. of new pdt. intro. 33.33 (51) 30.00 (40) .738 80.00 (5 ) 
Lower work-in-process 39.22 (51) 37.50 (40) .869 20.00 (5) 
New FMS installations 9.80 (51) 2.50 (40) .167 0.00 (5 ) 
Impv. maintenance program 33.33 (51) 35.00 (40) .870 40.00 (5) 
Rework 1990 (%) 8.46 (51) 9.96 (38) .583 20.52 (5) 
Rework 1996 (%) 5.40 (47) 5.56 (40) .905 9.34 (5 ) 
Scrap 1990 (%) 4.82 (43) 5.50 (38) .566 12.54 (5) 
Scrap 1996 (%) 2.77 (48) 4.14 (40) .357 5.64 (5) 
Quality circles 1990(% yes) 17.39 (46) 18.42 (38) .904 40.00 (5) 
Quality circles 1996(% yes) 40.00 (50) 45.00 (40) .638 20.00 ( 5) 
Measure quality 1990(% yes) 17.39 (46) 35.90 (39) .053 60.00 (5 ) 
Measure quality 1996(% yes) 36.00 (50) 57.50 (40) .042 60.00 (5) 
TQM 1990 (% yes) 10.87 (46) 17.95 (39) .356 40.00 (5) 
TQM 1996 (% yes) 40.82 (49) 57.50 (40) .120 80.00 (5 ) 
(Refer to note at bottom of 
table. ) 
Non-Defense < 800 
(Sample size ~ 51) 
Defense < 800 emp. 
(Sample size = 40) 
Obs. * 
(2-Tail ) 
Defense ~ 800 emp. 
(Sample size ~ 5) 
ISO 9000 CERTIFIED 1990: 
No (%) . 
· 1 
In process (%) 
· 2 
Yes (%) . . 
· 3 
frequency: 
44 98% 
2 % 
-­
-­
frequency: 
37 95% 
1 3% 
1 3% 
frequency: 
5 100% 
-­ -­
-­
-­
ISO 9000 CERTIFIED 1996: 
No (%) 
· 1 
In process (%) 
• 2 
Yes (%) . 
· 3 
22 45% 
11 22% 
16 33% 
7 18% 
21 52% 
12 30% 
frequency: 
-­ -­
1 20% 
4 80% 
Long range plan 1990(% yes) 17.02 (47) 23.08 (39) .488 60.00 (5) 
Long range plan 1996(% yes) 58.82 (51) 57.50 (40) .900 100.00 (5) 
Note: Obs.Sig.*: T-Tests observed significance level for difference in means between the non-defense related firms and the defense firms 
with fewer than 800 employees in 1990 and 1996. 
Table V Manufacturing Capabilities: Means (n=valid cases; "1" signifies highest priority, the lowest) 
(Refer to note at bottom of Non-Defense < 800 Defense < 800 emp. Obs. Sig.* Defense ~ 800 emp. 
table. ) (Sample size = 51) (Sample size = 40) (2-Tail) (Sample size 5) 
DEFENSE: RANKING OF 
MANUFACTURING CAPABILITIES: 
Def. Quality 1990 NA 1.7714 (35) 2.60 (5) 
Def. Dependability 1990 NA 2.8857 (35) 3.00 (5) 
Def. Delivery 1990 NA 2.7059 (34) 3.20 (5) 
Def. Cost 1990 NA 2.7143 (35) 3.80 (5) 
Def. Flexibility 1990 NA 4.4286 (35) 3.80 (5) 
Def. Innovation 1990 NA 5.3714 (35) 4.00 (5) 
Def. Quality 1996 NA 1. 6471 (34) 2.20 (5 ) 
Def. Dependability 1996 NA 2.9412 (34) 3.00 (5) 
Def. Delivery 1996 NA 2.4545 (33) 3.80 (5 ) 
Def. Cost 1996 NA 3.0882 (34) 2.60 (5 ) 
Def. Flexibility 1996 NA 4.4706 (34 ) 3.60 (5) 
Def. Innovation 1996 NA 5.2059 (34 ) 5.00 (5 ) 
COMMERCIAL: RANKING OF MFG. 
CAPABILITIES: 
Com. Quality 1990 1. 8889 (45) 2.0263 (38) .615 1.0000 (5) 
Com. Dependability 1990 3.2889 (45) 3.3684 (38) .800 2.5000 (5) 
._ .. _._ ....... __ ....... __ .__._ ..... ­_.__ 
Note: 	 Obs.Sig.*: T -Tests observed significance level for difference in means between the non-defense related firms and the defense firms 
with fewer than 800 employees in 1990 and 1996. 
(Refer to note at bottom of 
table. ) 
Non-Defense < 800 
(Sample size = 51) 
Defense < 800 emp. 
(Sample size = 40) 
Obs. Sig.* 
(2-Tail) 
Defense 
(Sample 
~ 800 emp. 
size = 5) 
Com. Delivery 1990 2.8667 (45) 2.4865 (37) .193 2.7500 (5 ) 
Com. Cost 1990 3.0000 (45) 2.3947 (38) .058 2.5000 ( 5) 
Com. Flexibility 1990 4.5111 (45) 4.3158 (38) .513 4.5000 (5) 
Com. Innovation 1990 5.2000 (45) 4.9474 (38) .453 4.0000 (5) 
Com. Quality 1996 1. 6200 (50 ) 2.0526 (38) .113 1. 2500 (5) 
Com. Dependability 1996 3.4000 (50) 3.3947 (37) .986 2.7500 (5) 
Com. Delivery 1996 2.9400 (50) 2.3784 (37) .046 3.2500 (5) 
Com. Cost 1996 2.9388 (49) 2.4211 (38) .102 3.0000 (5) 
Com. Flexibility 1996 4.4490 (49) 4.2632 (38 ) .527 4.5000 (5) 
Com. Innovation 1996 5.1837 (49) 5.0000 (38) .549 3.7500 (5 ) 
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